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I saw this guy on the train I And he seemed to gave gotten stucki In one of those
abstract trances.! And he was going: "Ugh... Ugh... Ugh... " And Fred said: I
"/ think he's in some kind ofpain. I I think it's a pain cry." I And I said: "Pain
cry? I Then language is a virus." Language! It's a virus! I Language! It's a
virus!
- Laurie Anderson, Language is a Virus
this paper is written with the anticipation Ofthe reader having a
basic knowledge ofwittgenstein's philosophy. thisjrees mejrom
haVing to define terms and waste space (and thereby limiting the
reader with my definitions. their understanding ofthe topics will
be read into the paper regardless ofthe safeguards i place on it
with definitions and handholding, but i find this to be a good
thing, as the number of interpretations of my point may grow
then, and the differences will be over the argument itselfand not
the terms which surround it. don't discuss the depth grammar
within the game.) much of what i am going to say will seem
obvious, but sometimes the obvious is what is overlooked. by tlte
way: i'm not using private language here (though i am writing it
to myself- in English).
I. Private Language

1. Isolating the Private Language Argument is like removing a stone from
a wall, then pointing to the stone and saying "This is a walL" Exposing the
Private Language Argument is like pointing at a stone in a wall and saying
"This is part of a wall." The difference is that one remains grounded in its
place, and the place defines it-it is recognized in its relation to the place.
The other is seen without a context. Without the place, it is senseless. 1
I I urn in agreement with Kripke when he says" ... we will only increase our difficult
argument if we call §243 onward 'the private language argument' and study ilin isolation from
the preceding material" (Kripke, p. 81). However, this is not to say it should not be done to
understand its place in the work as a whole. If it is done to separate it from the rest of the work:
that is where the problem lies. However, Kripke makes this mistake himself: he discusses the
private Janguage argument in Willgenstein on Rules and Private Languages while ignoring
the preceding statements and paragraphs in the Philosophicallnvestigati011S. He does not
take his own advice and warnings.
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The Private Language Argument is Wittgensteln's attack on tradi
tional philosophical methods and philosophicallanguage-games,2 and his
attempt to show their lack ofmeaning and sense. He was striking at the roots
of the philosophical project as it had grown over the past 2,500 years or so,
attempting to prune it back so it could grow strong this time, and not twisted
and weak, as he saw it to be. He exposed the propensity of philosophers to
argue over points which are not applicable to much of anything,3 and how
they do not seem to be In contact with the real world, and would prefer to
believe their theories rather than what they had seen.4Wittgenstein was able
to use it as both an argument to support his stand on the other topics he
discusses in the Philosophical Investigations and as an example of the
problems he was attacking.
2. Private Language: what is it, and how does it relate to the rest of

Wittgenstein? This is the question that must first be investigated when we
discuss private language as discussed in the Philosophical Investigations.
Without an understanding of how it relates to the rest of the text, the
argumentis left suspended from nothing. The supports from a structure must
not be removed: they then become useless (they aren't supporting anything)
and the structure will collapse. Using the supports in another structure can
be done only if a) the structure is designed to incorporate the support, or, b)
the support is modified to work within the structure. The Private Language
Argument, I hold, only fits within Wittgenstein' s overall structure when left
unmodified. Even lfthe supports are removed to study it, unless one knows
how it works with the rest of the structure it will be unclear as to what it does
exactly. It is only effective as it is within the environment that was created
for it. Therefore, the Private Language Argument cannot be removed from
the Philosophical Investigations and stand on its own, just as the surface
grammar of a language game cannot be seen out of cOntext and still be
intelligible. Ex.: You are Sitting in a room and you hear snippets of
2Including his Theory of Language in the Tractatus. and the rest of the Tractatus also.
He is not simply going after other philosophers: he is going after himself in the past, and that
past self was a traditional philosopher to the COte-an obvious target for him to go aflcr.
JWilness the "Angels on the Head of a Pin" debate which was once so popular in
philosophical circles, but has now been superseded by relativism and SuperSkepticism: how
many ways can we look at something without seeing it?
4 See: Skepticism
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conversation coming out of the next room. To speculate on the meaning of
these snippets is nearly impossIble, as you are hearing them out of context,
and are not actively in the game.sThe following illustration pictures how
Language Games can be compared to the use of the Private Language
Argument in the Philosophical Investigations.
Wittgenstein's use of the PrivateLanguage Argumentis subtle. His
use is careful and planned, and 1) it holds a central place in the construction
of his book, taking up a great deal ofspace (both physically and idea-wise),
and 2) it is one of his central arguments in his assault on the Tractatus. It Is
both interesting and important to note that he did not mark itoffas aseparate
chapter or section. He left it in as part of the rest of the text, flowing right
along with it (no breaks allowed), further backing up my claim (textually)
that the argument cannot stand on its own as it is senseless on its own. Both
the form ofthe text and its content lead me to believe this. Ex.: considerhow
the Tractatus would read if one of the sections were removed.
3. The Language itself... what language games could exist in a private

language? How would the grammar hold together? It seems to me from
reading On Certainty that as our experiences are what we can base our
thinking upon, our experiences show us that language is a group activity.
Therc is no need whatsoever for a private language, as one would not have
to tell oneself something: onc· is aware:
Olher people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from
my behaviour,-for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
(PI, §246)

The question is complete nonsense ifone thinks ofthe idea oflanguagebeing
learned and then later the question pops up: it is never there to begin with,
but comes back later; it is a philosophical question. It is not a thinking
question. It leads to statements (said in all sincerity and honesty) such as "I
know that is a tree." These statements are said as if they prove something or
verify something, as if they proved what was said or that they mean more
than they say. They are not treated as they actually function in reality: as
statements attempting to reference the depth grammar. There is no need to
5To be actively in a language game does not require one to be actively involved but to
simply know what the game is. That is why it is so hard to break into the middle of a
conversation and still be able to make intelligible comments or to enter the flow of the
dialogue.
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reference the depth grammar (itis there, itis a given in the game), but as that
is being done, the statement can only function as a statement and not as a
proposition. Are either necessary when one deals with oneself, when one
talks to oneself? Would the language one uses in discussing matters with
oneself be the same as the language used when discussing matters with
others who speak the same language? One does not need to tell oneself the
statements (just as they are unnecessary in a language game) and one does
not need to deliberate with oneself in a language, and if one does, it is my
experience that intuition plays a key role in the process, and if the delibera
tion is done with language, we take two sides, we deliberate with ourselves
with us taking both the selfand other places in the argument.1i
4. §256-"But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensa
tion, but only had the sensation?" (PI). If there in no natural expression, i.e.,
language in common with other people, does that mean that a private
language in not a natural expression forWittgenstein? I think so. A private
language is terribly unnatural.7
5. Why is it that Wittgenstein seems to feel a need for some sort oflogical
argument vs. private language when he seems to have a common sense
argument in his other arguments?8 Perhaps he is anticipating those who want
the philosophical answer. §275 seems to me to be a cutting comment:
275. Look at the blueof the sky and say to yourself "How blue the
sky is1"-When you do it spontaneously-without philosophical
intentions-the idea never crosses yourmind that this impression
of colour belongs only to you. And you have no hesitation in
exclaiming that to someone else. And if you point at anything as
you say the words you point at the sky. I am saying: you have not
the feeling of pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies
'naming the sensation' when one is thinking about 'private
language.' Nor do you think that really you ought not to point to
the color with your hand, but with your attention. (Consider what
it means "to point to something with the attention.") (PI)
6Can it be otherwise, and if so, 'does it remain deliberation?
7To not have a "natural expression for a sensation" is to be Ayer's Crusoe-but not on
Ayer's tenns. This is Ayer's Crusoe on Wittgenstein's lenns. Aquestion is leftlo be answered:
is a man without language truly a human for Wittgenstein?
•Albeit his is an extremely logical common sense argwnent, but is it then still common
sense?
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II. The Private Language Argument

6. "5.6 The Umitso/my language mean the limits of my world" (1L~p).9In
the early Wittgenstein, a private language limits the world to what is
sensed. 10 This removes the outer language, as the private language would
constrain the outer language, and one could not express anything in theouter
language that could not be expressed in the private language. The private
language would have to be extraordinarily complex for a person to commu~
nicate with others if this would be the case. 11 The communication between
the public and private: would there not be something lost between the two?
(Isn't there anyway?)
"5.62 ... The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the
limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the
limits of my world" (1L-P). These are the beginnings of the problem.l 2
7.§243- You can talk to yourself, but in what language is that discussion?
My experience shows me I talk to myself in English, my native tongue. If
I used a private language, would I not have to translate everything between
the two if I wanted to communicate with somcone else? Also: why would
one want to have a language to use with oneseifabout something one already
knows (though, as Wlttgcnstein states, you do not know you are in pain, you
simply are), that is, the sensations?
8.§246-"The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they
doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myselr' (PI). Language
is communication, not only of thoughts and arguments but ofinformation:
there is no need to communicate information with oneself-discuss, delib~
erate, debate, those can (and should) be done, but to communicate informa
tion one has with oneself is nonsensical. One cannot doubt the information
one has (the veracity of it, perhaps) but not what it is, as in the case of
sensations. You do not know, you have. I3
9 Does this imply that I cannot expand my world without expanding my language? Can
we not sense or respond to something if we do not have it in our language?
lOIs reading sensing?
II A person would have to have a rich private language lind an amazing amount of
sensations allowed by their private language if they were to communicate those experiences
with others or they would be in danger of continually being passed over in silence/passing
over in silence.
11Ifit wasn't for 5.62 in the TL.P, Wittgenstcin might not have had this to deal with, I'd
imagine.
13 §249-Lying? Ue to yourself in your own private language? "(Lying is a language·
game that needs to be learned like any other one)" (Pl). If this is true, where did one learn to
lie to oneself?
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9. I believe thatI have covered enough ofthe argumentto illustrate my point.
Wittgenstein is illustrating his argument with illustrated arguments. He has
shown how traditional philosophy asks needless questions that cause far
more problems than they start. The debate over "can there be a Private
Language?" is silly (Wittgenstein knows this) as the questions are
philosphical, and are not asked except by immature minds (Oe, §§310-317).
Questions about things one cannot doubt (Am I feeling this feeling I feel
right now?) are meaningless.
10. To RecapitulateIRestateJ Add: Ifthe Private Language argument is taken
out of context, taken out of the Philosphical Investigations, the "Depth
Grammar" of the argument (the rest of the book) is ignored, and therefore
the argument itself is without any relevance whatsoever. The argument must
be taken in context, and if it is not, the argument is either Unintelligible,
because of the missing depth grammar (a fish out of water) or it means
something completely different than it originally did due to new depth
grammar surrounding it.
III. Private Relations
/flanguage were liquid/ It would be rushing in/ Instead here we are / In silence
more eloquent / Than any word could ever be
Words are too solid/ They don't move jast enough/To catch the blur in the
brain / 111at flies by and is gone / Gone / Gone / Gone
I'd like to meet you / In a timeless / Placeless place / S01newhere out ojcontext /
And beyond all consequences
I won't USe words again/They don't mean what I meant/They don't say what I
said/ They're just the crust ojthe meaning / With realms underneath
/ Never touched/ Never stirred/ Never even moved through
--SuzanneVega,Language

11. Suppose I tell someone who has never read any Wittgenstein about thc
Private Language Argument. Their first reaction will be "Thatis silly. There
is no reason for an argument against private language, as thcre cannot be
one. I do not have one, and have never met anyone claiming to have one."
Wittgenstein makes a good argument against private language (as shown
earlier) but his prime argument is not against private language, but against
philosophy. He also says (essentially) "This (the Private Language idea) is
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silly, "but "'This" is both Private Language and Philosophy for Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein wants thinking. not incoherent questions/discussions,14
12. "Meaningless" A Private Language would be meaningless even ifthere
was one-consider how, as Wittgenstein points out, I do not say, "I know
I have a pain" in order to let myself know-I Simply have the pain. See §246
as this is so-why would we have a personal language to discuss our
sensations with ourselves? "Oh I think that hurts-let me check-oh yes, I
feel S." It does not work that way. We feel it-and do we discuss the pain
with ourselves? No. We discuss eliminating it-in fact, I would not call it
"discussing"- we run over a list ofpossible responses to the pain we have
built up over time to deal with pain, gained from our experiences. Discussion
comes when we deal with someone else. We only deliberate in conscious
language over something when we are planning to express it to someone
else. We have no need to explain itto ourselves. The raw data our minds deal
with is not kept from our minds by a private language-our minds deal
directly with it. This is what makes expressing our feelings sohard-wefeel.
and as we do not have aninner language, we musttake the raw data and move
it into the language wc wish to express ourselves in. Ifwe did not, we could
translatc between our inner language and the outer one we speak. But there
is no need to. What we lose in meaning we gain in speed. To act quickly
means that our processing time must be kept to a minimum. A language
between us and our sense would mean we could not react quickly.I5

13. AJ. Ayer, for example, Ii fis the Pri vate Language Argument directly out
of the Philosophical Investigations in his essay "Can There Be a Private
Language?" and seems to understand it in terms of a language used for
communication between entities. for he says" ... it is obvious that there can
be private languages. There can be, because there are" (Pitcher, p. 250). He
immediately assumes the existence of such a language, which makes him at
once unable to see Wittgenstein's point clearly, He says:

I~ Here we have found the reason for the Private Language argument (and his later
works): this work is against philosophy. Remember the philosopher pointing at the tree and
saying "I know that's a tree. ff
ISHowever: could the basisoflanguage be hard-wired into us, and thelanguagewespeak:
simply be the program we run on top of it?
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It is, however, possible that a very secretive diarist may not be
satisfied with putting familiar words into an unfamiliar notation,
but may prefer to invent new words: the two processes are in any
case not sharply distinct. Ifbe carries his invention far enough be
can properly be said to be employing a pri vate language (Pitcher,
p.250).

Ayer is standing in the camp of the Ostensive Definitioners when he makes
this statement. He sees naming and words as the starting point oflanguage.
What he fails to see, however, is that the "private" language the diarist
develops is developed from and takes the place of the original language he
speaks: this is not a private language, but a new language that has another
language for a background. It could easily (as much as learning a language
is easy) be learned by someone else. A couple of questions arise:
Wittgenstein's "S" diary: Why? This is a simple question. Why would one
use a private language rather than the language used already by the person
to mark when a feeling is felt, or some other private action occurs? This
serves no PU1JXlse, other than to make a list (as if one would do this for a
doctor or a class, reports, etc.), and is in essence a meaningless activity. To
see the end of it all for Ayer: he comes down to descriptions and descriptive
language-in effect, you need descriptions of things, even for yourself, and
the language is the key to the description. Each name is related to a
description. The names must be removed, says Wittgenstein: Ostensive
Definitions cause far more problems than they are worth. Ayer does not see
that in order to attach a description to a name one cannot just name first: one
must be able to articulate the description; i.e., one must have a language that
name and description fit into. The structures must be there in the first place,
or there is nowhere for a word or definition to reside. Naming is a part of the
bigger language: language does not come from naming.
To Conclude:

Ayer missed the point by a long shot. Hel6 has removed (Isolated) the
argument and is treating it as if it can be separated from the rest of the
Philosophical Investigations. He does not see the rest of the forest and is
liable to brain himself if he is not careful. Wittgenstein was illustrating and
using the argument to strengthen the rest ofhis thesis-he never intended for
16 Ayer is not the philosopher looking at the tree and saying "I know that is a tree."
Instead, he says, "That is a tree" "that is grass" "That is sky."
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it to gain a life of its own.171bis again shows how philosophers have a habit
of philosophical thinking. not of real thinking.18 Ayer is exactly what

Wittgenstein is fighting: the philosopher who putters about in meaningless
philosphicallanguage games. 19
Alice thought to herself, "Then there's no use in speaking." The
voices didn't join in this time, as she hadn't spoken, but, to her
great surprise, they all thought in chorus (I hope you understand
what thinking in chorus means-for 1must confess that I don't),
"Better say nothing at all. Language is worth a thousand pounds
a word!"
-Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

I1Wittgenstein touched Philosophy's collective nerve when he brought up this subject.
Why is Private Language something that is fought over? What does it matter? I believe that
Wittgenstein knew how other philosophers would react to bis ideas. To him the argument was
support for his thesis and not much else. For other philosophers, it became their route to
employment... Whar does it matter? is an enquiry that must eventually be made so we can
better know the psychology of philosophers (note: psychology makes the same mistakes as
philosophy).
II Remember the language game: context (depth grammar) controls the mellning. By
removing the argument, the depth grammar is ignored, and the argument hilS no sense in its
original sense. I do not know if Wittgenstein would say it has any sense at all.
19 What of "Words we cannot say?" When we know something, and understand it-we
sometimes cannot express it in the language we speak. This implies II problem with our
spoken language.
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